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Abstract 
In this study we explore the effect on cash holdings on firms transition between the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Main Market (MM) on the London Stock 
Exchange. The study uses data from 2000 to 2014, collected for the two markets. The mean 
industry adjusted cash holdings after the move reports a 18.47% decrease for moves from 
the MM to the AIM, while a 62.10% decrease for the moves from the AIM to the MM. 
Overall, findings suggest there is a decrease in cash holdings when firms transition from the 
Main to the AIM market, but not from the AIM to the Main.  
The study also explores the impact that bankruptcy proximity has on companies’ cash 
holdings. Firms that are closer to bankruptcy drive the results for the MM to AIM transition.  
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Resumo 
Este estudo explora o impacto na liquidez das empresas que mudam entre o 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) e o Main Market (MM) da Bolsa de Valores de 
Londres. Os dados recolhidos para os dois mercados dizem respeito aos períodos 2000 até 
2014. A média ajustada para a indústria da posse de liquidez após a mudança de mercado 
reporta uma queda de 18,47% para as mudanças do MM para o AIM e simultaneamente uma 
redução de 62,10% para as mudanças do AIM para o MM. Os resultados demonstram uma 
redução de liquidez quando as empresas mudam do MM para o AIM, mas não no caso 
inverso. 
O estudo também avalia a influência que a proximidade da falência tem sobre a posse 
de liquidez das empresas analisadas. Os resultados demonstram que são as empresas mais 
próximas da falência que originam, os resultados da transição do MM para o AIM. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Liquidez; Alternative Investment Market; Main Market. 
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Introduction 
Moving between the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock 
Exchange and the Main Market (MM) is a process that might have an impact on the firm’s 
behaviour and performance. As suggested by Brisker et al. (2013) it is important to note that 
firm index addition should not be considered an information-free event. Accessibility to 
credit can be one of the major drivers for boosting firm performance and expansion, where 
credibility and transparency, among other variables, will play a fundamental role in obtaining 
these investment instruments. For this reason, it is expected that a change in the market of 
listing has an impact on the cash holding policy followed by firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies regarding the transition of the AIM to the MM (and vice 
versa) for the UK and its relationship with cash holdings policies. 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the impact of the transition between the AIM 
and the MM on the company’s cash holdings policies using data from 2000 up to 2014. Opler 
et al. (1999) defines that firms with strong growth opportunities, riskier cash flows and 
smaller size hold more cash than firms with a greater access to the capital market and similarly 
with a larger size. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse what happens in the transition process 
and how cash holding policies alter along the way. To capture this transition effect, it will be 
necessary to account for several variables affecting the sample. These will range from the 
specific characteristics of the markets in which the companies trade in, such as, the regulatory 
flexibility of the AIM of the London Stock Exchange compared with the MM and firm 
specific characteristics regarding the decision-making process, specifically, corporate 
governance changes and its impact. 
The study will be divided into sections. Section 1 will explore the meaning of some 
important terms related to the topic focusing on the understanding of cash holdings together 
with its importance and possible impact in the firm global decision making. Additionally, a 
description of the two markets is provided in section 2. This section will also provide a 
comparison regarding the requirements needed to enter each market. This intends to show 
the different regulatory systems the AIM and the MM run. It is expected to allow a better 
understanding of the company’s decisions. Since, the AIM is a recent market, a framework 
of its history will be provided to raise awareness to the increasing importance it has 
developed. Section 2 also provides some examples of successful changes that have occurred 
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in the past. Additionally, this section will explore the motives behind a company’s decision 
to move from the MM to the AIM which are expected to be related with the properties of 
the markets. Section 3 outlines the hypothesis explored in this study. Section 4 provides a 
brief description of the methodological approach used together with information on the data 
used to conduct the study. In this section a detailed description of the dependent and 
independent variables used to produce the results is also provided. Section 5 presents the 
results and their respective discussion. Finally, section 6 concludes the dissertation and 
displays further ideas for research. 
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1. Cash holdings 
Cash held by a firm is dependent on the relationship between the marginal benefit 
and marginal cost associated with the operation (Opler et al., 1999), which comes directly 
from the static trade-off model. Therefore, defining the amount of liquidity the company will 
count with is always influenced by this relation. The marginal cost and benefit regarding 
holding cash are consequently the main areas influencing liquidity in the balance sheet of 
firms. As highlighted by Opler et al. (1999) firms with strong growth opportunities, riskier 
cash flows and smaller size hold more cash when compared with firms who have greater 
access to the capital market and a larger dimension. On the one hand, we can relate these 
conclusions to the costs and benefits assuming large firms, with a facilitated access to the 
capital markets, have a minor benefit and a significant cost to hold cash and therefore decide 
not to. On the other hand, companies in the opposite scenario, smaller size, restrict access 
to the capital markets, among other characteristics will have a higher benefit and presumably 
a lower cost, proportion wise. Under these two main areas (benefits and costs) there are a 
range of other reasons that can always be reduced to a cost and benefit analysis. The 
following are all reasons and motives that drive firms to hold cash and will be thoroughly 
described in the section below. 
1.1. Motives for holding cash 
In his book, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”, John 
Maynard Keynes (1936) identified three major motives that influence companies to hold 
cash: precautionary, transaction and speculative motive. Since then they have been identified 
as the most predominant and general motives for holding cash. However, these are not the 
only motives that drive and condition firms cash holding levels. Other factors influencing 
companies cash holding policies (analysed in sections below) are corporate governance and 
the regulation of the market in which the company operates in. For this case the regulatory 
systems analysed are the AIM and the MM of the London Stock Exchange. 
1.1.1. Precautionary Motive 
As the name suggests the first outlined reason for managers to hold cash is as a means 
of protection. In other words, their incentive to hold cash is to settle for future contingencies. 
These might include the most diverse types, ranging from taxes to unexpected conditions 
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such as, natural disasters (this last case reports to one of the most extreme and less probable 
situations). This means that firms will need “liquid assets to finance its investments and 
acquisitions in cases when other sources of funding are unavailable or very costly” (Brisker 
et al., 2013).  
As a substitute of cash, firms use external funds. There are some problems with this 
type of financing, such as, information asymmetry and agency conflicts. The first is 
thoroughly described in Myers & Majful (1984) where it is even suggested that to increase 
liquidity, firms could issue stock in periods where managers have no information advantage. 
These information asymmetry problems arise from agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986) which 
will directly influence the amount of cash held by the company (Dittmar et al., 2003). 
Therefore, following the idea expressed in the previous study, managers see cash as the best 
alternative to cover possible investments when external financing is too costly (Nason and 
Patel, 2016). 
1.1.2. Transaction Motive 
The term “transaction motive” was first suggested by Keynes (1936) as one of the 
main causes for holding cash. Firms need cash to finance their daily operations and therefore 
it is essential (in varying proportions) that firms have the adequate amount of liquidity. As it 
was already mentioned above, the main advantage of holding cash is the ability to avoid the 
transaction costs associated with external financing (Brisker et al., 2013). The transaction 
costs previously mentioned, are directly related with the inefficient conversion of assets 
which are less liquid than cash to comply with the firms’ operational activities.  
1.1.3. Speculative Motive 
Firms can also hold cash to account for the possibility of future gains. This allows a 
direct relationship with Opler et al. (1999) where it is stated that companies with higher 
growth opportunities are the ones that hold more cash. These firms are therefore looking 
forward and always ready for a new incursion on the market, either through acquisitions or 
other investments. Cash accessibility allows them to operate fast and catch the best 
opportunities available in the market. 
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The main problem for these growth firms is related to the cost of holding the assets, 
when there is no investment to cancel out the costs. These can be related to the lower rate 
of return of the assets and some tax disadvantages (Brisker et al., 2013).  
1.1.4. Corporate Governance 
Amongst the motives that explain the levels of cash held by firms is corporate 
governance structure. A wide variety of authors have studied the impact of corporate 
governance structure in cash holding policies, all from different perspectives. Harford et al. 
(2008) and Kalcheva & Lins (2007) identified a negative relation between corporate 
governance and cash holdings. In Harford et al. (2008), by analysing companies with strong 
and others with weak governance it was possible to depict that the firms in the second tier 
(weak governance) held less cash due to high levels of capital expenditure and frequent 
acquisitions. The ones in the first tier opt for an increase dividend policy committing the 
company to higher payouts in the future. The study was conducted for the US market. 
Kalcheva & Lins (2007) conducted a study compiling empirical evidence from a total of 31 
countries and found that firm values are lower when controlling managers hold more cash 
and external country-level shareholder protection is weak. Following the shareholder 
protection approach there is also Dittmar et al. (2003) highlighting that when low levels of 
shareholder protection are verified, investment opportunities and asymmetric information 
become secondary when it comes to settling the firm’s cash holding policies. In this study, it 
was also shown that in countries (their sample included 45 countries) with lower shareholder 
protection, companies held higher levels of cash. 
Moreover, an issue thoroughly described in the literature and with many applications 
to the corporate governance structure approaches is management entrenchment. Managers 
have an incentive to invest the firm’s resources in assets whose value is higher under them 
than under any other manager (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). This practice (entrenchment) is 
vastly affected by high levels of cash holdings (Harford et al., 2008; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007) 
which contribute, in lower shareholder protection environments, to non-market value 
maximisation investments, in most cases. It was then concluded that in cases where 
shareholders have more rights and control over companies tended to store less cash than 
otherwise (Harford et al., 2008).  
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Agency problems are another factor affecting firms cash holding policies. It is known 
that agency conflicts tend to have a higher impact on firms with a high free cash flow (Jensen, 
1986). This happens together with the already mentioned impact of poor investor protection 
policies on cash holdings (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Harford et al., 
2008). 
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2. AIM vs. MM 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was 
created in 1995 with the purpose of serving growing companies in the UK that could not 
afford the access to capital through the Main Market (MM). It started, according to the LSE 
AIM Factsheet, with 10 British companies and currently counts with 995 firms, where 815 
have their headquarters in the United Kingdom and the remaining 180 being international 
firms. Accompanying this growth was the overall market value, which increased from £82.2 
million (June 1995) to £80,883.4 million (October 2016)1 in 21 years of existence. This 
market value rise is an indicator of the increasing importance this market has been acquiring 
and therefore makes it appealing to study. As a consequence of its success and popularity the 
AIM format has been adopted by other countries, such as, Japan with “Tokyo AIM” being 
launched in April 2009 and Italy with “AIMItalia” being launched in December 2008 
(Gerakos, 2013). 
The London Stock Exchange MM is one of the “world’s most international market 
for the admission and trading of equity, debt and other securities”2. This is one of the oldest 
markets in the world as it was founded in 1801. Data collected on the 30th December 2016 
reveals that the MM comprises a total of 2,267 companies with an overall market value of 
£4,582,465 million. 
As it is mentioned by the London Stock Exchange, AIM’s success has “underpinned 
by its regulatory framework” 3. This means that the regulation applied to the companies 
included in the AIM is one of the features, determinant for the market’s success. Belonging 
to the AIM can therefore be expected to be a simpler task when it comes to restrictions and 
barriers of entry. 
The first identifiable barrier has to do with the fee’s companies pay to be admitted in 
such markets. These fees are dependent on the firms required market capitalisation and, as 
it is conveyed below, these fees are substantially higher for companies willing to join the MM 
                                                 
1 Source: LSE AIM Factsheet 
2 Source: London Stock Exchange 
3 London Stock Exchange: Guide to AIM 
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than for those willing to join AIM. Companies applying to the MM will according to the 
London Stock Exchange Fees for Issuers file (1st April 2016) have to pay a maximum of 
£475,000 (plus VAT) as admission fee for new issues, whilst further issues will be charged 
an amount to the new issues with the exception of a 25 per cent discount for issuers with a 
market capitalisation at the time of issue of £500m and below4 (see table A.1. in the annexes). 
Companies willing to enter AIM will pay a maximum admission fee of £92,000 (dependent 
on the firm’s market capitalisation), whereas companies reporting a less than £5 million 
market capitalisation are not submitted to any other further issues (see table A.2. in the 
annexes). Firms above the £5 million market capitalisation level requiring further issues will 
be subject to a maximum fee of £46,250 also dependent on the market capitalisation. 
Additionally, since 1st April 2016 all AIM companies must pay an annual fee of £6,5005. This 
means that the most expensive company joining AIM (>£250 million market capitalisation) 
is charged £92,000 (plus VAT) in admission fees plus the £6,500 annual fee, which is subject 
to a pro-rata update depending on the date of admission.  
Another distinct restriction when joining the two markets has to do with the trading 
history companies must withhold. For firms joining the MM it is required that they already 
have a 3-year trading period, while for the AIM no restriction applies in this point. This is an 
important feature as it makes a clear division regarding the purpose of each market. By not 
requiring any previous trading period we can depict the openness of the AIM towards small 
and mid-sized companies. 
Regulation is, as already stated, the great difference between the AIM and MM. The 
MM is an EU Regulated Market where companies need to produce and deliver a full 
Prospectus to be approved by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA)6. Companies joining the 
AIM are regulated by Nominated Advisers (Nomads)7, which are regulated by a specific team 
within the LSE. This team is formed by lawyers, accountants and corporate financiers that 
                                                 
4 London Stock Exchange: Fees for Issuers 
5 London Stock Exchange: Fees for companies and nominated advisers 
6 LSE: Rules and Regulations 
7 Firms who have practiced corporate finance for a minimum of two years prior to application, responsible for 
guiding AIM companies through the admission process (all the due diligence and admission documents 
preparation) and its subsequent life as a public company (regulating the company through AIM rules). These 
are usually investment banks or corporate financing firms. 
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among other tasks, develop the AIM rules, monitor indexed companies’ compliance with 
regulations and approve and monitor the Nomads. The AIM therefore provides a 
customized regulation administered through the private sector (Gerakos, 2013). 
And interesting difference between the two markets, stated in Vismara, Paleari, and 
Ritter (2012) and Farinha et al. (2018) is the fact that firms incorporating the AIM are 
characterised by higher bid-ask spreads, and lower share turnover when compared with Main 
Market firms. 
2.1. Successful moves from AIM to MM 
The following study looks at the impact of cash holdings when a company moves 
between the AIM and the MM. As such it is interesting to show that there are already some 
examples of companies that grew inside the AIM and then transitioned to the MM with 
success. This emphasizes the importance of studying the resemblance and differences 
between these two markets. 
The first analysed example is Domino’s Pizza UK & IRL plc. This is one of the most 
mediatic examples of a successful transition to the MM. The pizza delivering company listed 
in the AIM in 1999 and by their MM listing press release had 501 stores in the UK and 
Ireland back in 2008. The last value comes from the 2015 Annual Report and states a total 
of 916 stores in the same territory. During their time in the AIM Domino’s Pizza registered 
a significant increase of their pre-tax profits, reportedly going from £1.8 million in 1999 to 
£18.7 million by the end of 2007. By this time the company registered a £308 million 
enterprise value, approximately8. It was a growing company that moved to the MM for a 
wide range of reasons, with Domino’s Chief Financial Officer of the time, Lee Ginsberg, in 
2010 pointing that “US funds preferred us on the Official List to AIM, because there is a 
stronger perception of corporate governance”. This statement shows that one of the 
advantages of the AIM, mentioned in the previous section (lower regulation when compared 
                                                 
8 Amadeus Database 
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to MM), can work as a disadvantage as well. By the end of 2015 Domino’s Pizza enterprise 
value stood at roughly £2,325 million9. 
Another successful case is Booker Group Plc. This is the largest wholesale company 
in the United Kingdom. The firm was founded in 1835 by George and Richard Booker. Later 
in 2000 it was purchased by the Big Food Group10. Then in 2004 the company joined the 
AIM, remaining for almost 5 years after leaving the index in 2009 for the MM being 
incorporated in the FTSE250 with an enterprise value of approximately £459 million11. By 
the end of 2015 Booker Group Plc. presented a £2,288 million12, approximate enterprise 
value showing the value increase it had gone through the latter years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Amadeus Database 
10 Booker Plc was bought by Iceland Supermarkets which belonged to the Big Food Group. In 2005 Booker 
Plc was separated from Iceland Supermarkets by the Big Food Group. 
11 Amadeus Database 
12 Amadeus Database 
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3. Hypothesis 
Following the previous literature review (sections 1 and 2) and discussion we now 
turn our attention to the definition of the hypothesis explored in this study. 
Looking at the wide diversity of motives companies have to hold cash it is 
understandable that a change in company cash holdings will not be due to one single factor. 
The definite reason behind the market movement is complex to capture as it ranges from 
corporate governance policies to strategic and management-based decisions. Together with 
the motives, we have to account for, the existing differences between the AIM and the MM 
as possible causes for changes in firm’s cash holding policies. Additionally, the financial 
moment of each firm can be a determinant in the interpretation of the decision to move. 
Financial distress is expected to work as a conditional characteristic influencing management 
decision-making on the future listing market, which is expected to affect the cash holding 
policies adopted from that moment onward. 
Companies that move from the MM to the AIM are expected to face less access to 
capital, therefore it is expected their level of cash holdings to increase following the market 
change. Companies moving from AIM to Main are expected to decrease their level of cash 
holdings. This is because they will be moving to a market where they will have better access 
to capital, which will then reduce the company’s necessity to hold cash. Hence, the two 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: Companies moving from Main to AIM will tend to increase their cash holdings 
as they will enter a market with less liquidity and less growth opportunities.  
H2: Companies moving from AIM to Main will tend to decrease their cash holdings 
as they will enter a market with more liquidity and more growth opportunities.  
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4. Sample, methodology and summary statistics 
4.1. Data and sample 
This study used financial information collected from the companies comprising the 
AIM and the MM. Financial data was collected from Worldscope and Datastream database 
and accounts for the period 2000 to 2014. Data comprising the changes between markets 
was manually retrieved. The process meant that yearly information of the AIM and Main 
market was individually collected from the London Stock Exchange13 for the sample period. 
To obtain the changes between each market we matched the companies in both datasets 
using their SEDOL codes, which were obtained manually by matching the firm name with 
its SEDOL. Then in order to verify our dataset we used the match between the company 
ID’s (denoted by their DSCD code) and matched them with the SEDOL code for each 
company.  Then by merging the financial information with the market change database we 
obtained the full sample for the study. This period was chosen since AIM is a relatively recent 
market and therefore the existing data for the initial years would comprise a low sample and 
some incomplete information which would not allow for a solid analysis. 
The sample was then conditioned to eliminate companies with ICBIC 8000, as this 
corresponds to financial firms, which, due to their operations would not produce reliable 
results regarding their management of cash holdings. The control variables used in the test 
were then winsorized at 1% in order to eliminate the outliers. To produce the regression 
results we used the two-way clustering following the positive results obtained by this method 
described in the available literature (Petersen, 2008; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010; 
Thompson, 2011).  
The main source used in this study for measuring the impact of the cash holdings 
changes between markets was the Brisker et al. (2013) approach. One major difference 
considering both studies is the composition of sample. Brisker et al. (2013) studied the 
impact, S&P 500 indexation had in cash holdings from 1971 to 2006. Due to the constraints 
already pointed out above, this was conducted for a smaller period. Brisker et al. (2013) also 
                                                 
13 Source: https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/aim/aim.htm 
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developed a [-5] to [+5] year analysis, with [-5] being the 5 years prior to inclusion and [+5] 
the 5 years after inclusion. This study considers two different approaches. It measures what 
happens to companies in a five-year period divided in two analysis, from [-2] to [+2] and 
from [-1] to [+1]14. Another difference is that companies were forced to be within this range. 
So, companies present in the sample have to be in the analysed periods. This means that the 
number of observations is the same within each period. 
After proceeding with the data cleaning processes expressed above we ended up with 
a sample comprising 201 companies corresponding to 1234 observations. In the analysis we 
managed to gather 145 companies (436 observations) and 126 companies (631 observations) 
for the companies moving from the MM to AIM for periods [-1,+1] and [-2,+2], respectively. 
While, for companies moving from AIM to MM we accounted for 29 companies (87 
observations) and 27 companies (135 observations) for the periods [-1,+1] and [-2,+2], 
respectively (see table 1). 
Table 1. Sample numbers (firms and observations) 
Sample numbers (firms and observations)    
Sample Full Sample 
MM to AIM AIM to MM 
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] 
Observations 1234 436 631 87 135 
Number of firms 201 145 126 29 27 
 
4.2. Model 
This study aims at finding the impact a market transition has on companies’ cash 
holdings. To depict this impact, the following model was used: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 × 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
9
𝑗=1
+ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡        (1) 
                                                 
14 -1 corresponds to the year company changed market, 0 corresponds to the year immediately after market 
change (for both periods) 
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The dependent variable is Cash and the independent (explanatory) variables include 
measures that intend to control the impact a market change has on cash holdings, such as, 
Inventory amount, debt amount through Leverage, among others. A more detailed version of 
the variables is provided below. The descriptive statistics of these variables is provided in 
table 2, while in table 3 we provide the correlation matrix between the analysed variables 
together with the respective statistical significance. 
4.3. Variables 
4.3.1. Dependent variable 
As our dependent variable, Cash Holdings are measured as cash and cash equivalents 
over assets (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Later, this variable was conditioned to find its the 
industry adjusted features (Brisker et al., 2013). 
4.3.2. Independent variables 
This study focused on the independent variables widely suggested in the literature. 
The set of firm specific variables used were the following: 
a. Acquisitions 
Acquisitions was computed as the level of acquisitions (per fiscal year) scaled by assets, 
Brisker et al. (2013).This variable is expected to have a negative correlation with a company’s 
cash reserves. This will happen as companies moving from the AIM to MM will tend to have 
less cash reserves as they have access to easier capital and therefore with leverage increase 
their level of acquisitions. The inverse relation is expected to happen with companies moving 
from MM to AIM, as the access to external financing can be expensive (Jensen, 1986; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). 
b. After 
 
The variable After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the years after the move to 
the AIM/MM and 0 for the years prior to the market change. 
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c. Cash flow 
This variable was determined by Net Income Before Preferred Dividends + Depreciation and 
Amortization, scaled by total assets. The following variable, considering the previous literature, 
provides a reliable measure of a company’s financial health, (Farinha et al., 2018). Also due 
to the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) when there is an increase in asymmetric 
information the cost of capital will increase. This is one of the differences between the AIM 
and the MM, where companies in the AIM are expected to have difficult access to capital 
making them rely on their internal resources. 
d. Expenditures 
This variable is computed as the total Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) over total assets. 
The inclusion of this variable has the purpose of showing the amount of long term 
investment a company can produce in the respective fiscal year. The impact of cash holdings 
can be seen in Expenditures as the dependent variable is expected to have a negative 
correlation with Expenditures (Denis and McKeon, 2017). 
e. Inventory 
This variable is composed by the level of Inventories over the total assets. Companies 
moving from the AIM to the MM may present lower levels of their inventories as they are 
expected to present a decrease in their investment opportunities (Brisker et al., 2013). This 
could drive inventories to also decrease. When looking at the move from the MM to the 
AIM a different result might arise. 
f. Leverage 
Leverage depicts the impact the debt structure of the company has on its cash 
holdings. This variable computed as the Short term debt + Long term debt, scaled by total 
assets. The literature shows that there is not a linear relationship between leverage and cash 
holdings (Guney, Ozkan & Ozkan, 2007), as different levels of leverage can report the same 
impact on cash holdings. 
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g. Market to Book 
This variable is used as a valuation figure of the company’s growth opportunities as 
it represents the difference between the market value of equity and the book value equity. 
The valuation inherent to this ratio allows for a statement on the under or over valuation of 
the respective firms, therefore capturing the possibility of more or less growth opportunities. 
We expect firms with greater growth opportunities (Opler et al., 1999) to have larger reserves 
of cash. However, it also possible for firms with greater growth opportunities to register less 
cash reserves as they can have incentives to profit from the better access to good financing 
opportunities. 
h. Net Equity Issue (NEI) 
The Net Equity Issue depicts the difference between the Total Equity Issue and the Total 
Equity Purchased, scaled by total assets (Brisker et al., 2013). This variable captures the 
proportion of new issuances for each fiscal year. It is foreseen by the previous literature that 
companies with a high level of equity issuance will tend to be looking for financing 
opportunities (Denis and McKeon, 2017). Companies seeking for more growth 
opportunities may benefit from an incorporation in the MM, provided the better access to 
financing opportunities. It is therefore expected that companies with a higher positive 
difference in this variable would also be the ones with lower cash holdings, as they have 
easier access to different financing types (for companies moving from AIM to MM). 
Moreover, the inverse is expected for companies moving from the MM to AIM. 
i. Net Working Capital (NWC) 
Net Working Capital is interpreted as a measure of a company’s operational efficiency 
or as its short term financial health. It comprises the difference between the current assets 
and liabilities, and was computed by Total Receivables + Total Inventories – Accounts Payable, 
scaled by total assets, Brisker et al. (2013). Companies moving from AIM to MM are expected 
to have a marginal decrease of their investment opportunities which can lead them to a 
reduction of their NWC (Riddick and Whited, 2009). Movements from MM to AIM may 
present different results as their motives to move market are uncertain. 
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j. Research and Development (R&D) 
This variable shows the total investment directed by the company towards R&D for 
each fiscal year with respect to total assets. The literature shows that companies with a higher 
cash holdings level will tend to allocate more expenditure towards their R&D (Opler et al., 
1999). Companies with high growth opportunities tend to hold more cash to total non-cash 
assets (Opler et al., 1999). 
k. Firm and year dummies 
In order to control for time and industry effects dummies are included in the model, 
namely the Year Fixed Effect and the Firm Fixed Effect. 
4.3.3. Observations 
In our analysis we also decided to include the variable Distributions which tested 
whether companies made any cash distributions during the measured years. To do this we 
introduced a dummy variable where 1 meant the firm had paid a dividend and 0 otherwise. 
Companies that pay dividends on a regular basis would face a negative reaction from financial 
markets when they decide to cut the dividend, which could lead them to hold more cash to 
fulfil this self-obligation (Farinha et al., 2018). However, firms in the sample were not paying 
dividends for the period being analysed, and hence this variable was excluded from the 
analysis.  
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2. displays the summary statistics respecting to the full sample of all the 
variables used in the analysis. It can be perceived, in the table, that the variable Cash Holdings 
on average accounts for 18% of total assets and that the market value is 1.67 times the 
average book value of the firms. Acquisitions represent 2.7% of total assets, while Leverage 
accounts for 15.8% of total assets. Inventories stand for 11.7% of total assets, while Expenditures 
represent 4.2% of total assets. Finally, R&D accounts for 3.7% of total assets. 
The correlation matrix for the whole sample and all the variables used in the analysis 
is presented in table 3. We can depict from the table that there is an obvious high and positive 
correlation between the variables Cash and Adjusted Cash. This is strictly because Adjusted Cash 
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is computed based on the variable Cash. Other than Adjusted Cash the variable Cash is 
positively correlated with R&D and Market-to-book and both statistically significant at 1%. 
Hence, the variable Cash is negatively correlated with the other variables, being all statistically 
significant at 1%. 
When we analyse the relationship between the cash adjusted to the operating industry 
we can denote that, just like Cash the only positive correlation is with R&D and Market-to-
book. All the other variables also report a negative correlation with Adjusted Cash. The only 
difference arises with the variable Expenditures, where it registers a 1% statistical significance 
for its correlation with Cash and a 5% statistical significance when correlated with Adjusted 
Cash. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics     
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Nº Observations Mean Standard Deviation p25 Median p75 
              
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.180 0.211 0.026 0.101 0.250 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 -0.032 0.270 -0.072 0.045 0.108 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.027 0.075 0 0 0.008 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.117 0.126 0.006 0.074 0.203 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.042 0.053 0.012 0.025 0.050 
𝑁𝑊𝐶
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.225 0.165 0.093 0.218 0.334 
𝑅&𝐷
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.037 0.097 0 0 0.022 
𝑀𝑇𝐵 1234 1.670 3.855 0.656 1.180 2.329 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 1234 0.158 0.172 0.003 0.115 0.258 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 1234 91665.47 233055.50 12522.00 29807.50 64602.00 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix          
Correlation Matrix 
  Cash Adjusted Cash Cash Flow Acquisitions Inventory Expenditures NWC R&D MTB Leverage Assets 
Cash 1.0000           
Adjusted Cash 0.9147 1.0000          
 0.0000           
Cash Flow -0.2259 -0.1323 1.0000         
 0.0000 0.0000          
Acquisitions -0.0880 -0.1103 0.0608 1.0000        
 0.0020 0.0001 0.0328         
Inventory -0.3479 -0.2391 0.1030 -0.0926 1.0000       
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0011        
Expenditures -0.0999 -0.0698 0.0336 -0.0436 -0.0698 1.0000      
 0.0004 0.0141 0.2387 0.1259 0.0143       
NWC -0.3365 -0.2662 0.1770 -0.1120 0.6402 -0.1357 1.0000     
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000      
R&D 0.3641 0.2099 -0.4445 -0.0474 -0.1868 -0.1077 -0.0784 1.0000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0957 0.0000 0.0002 0.0059     
MTB 0.1426 0.0975 0.0244 0.0676 -0.0629 0.0650 -0.0050 0.1034 1.0000   
 0.0000 0.0006 0.3924 0.0176 0.0271 0.0223 0.8621 0.0003    
Leverage -0.4110 -0.3653 -0.0625 0.0619 0.0548 0.0797 -0.0043 -0.0470 -0.1692 1.0000  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0281 0.0297 0.0544 0.0051 0.8810 0.0000 0.0987   
Assets -0.1282 -0.1214 0.0923 0.0615 -0.0965 0.1836 -0.1581 -0.1087 -0.0001 0.2356 1.0000 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0308 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.9967 0.0000 0.0001   
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5. Results 
5.1. MM to AIM 
5.1.1. Market change impact in companies cash holdings 
The first analysis focuses on the change in the variable cash scaled by assets for the 
different periods. Tables 3 and 4 show the change in this variable for the companies moving 
from MM to AIM. It is reported that cash level is, on average, higher on the first fiscal year 
after the change, seeing a drop in the subsequent years. This conclusion applies to both 
periods ([-1, +1]; [-2,+2]). For the first case there is a 6.10% increase from period [-1] to 
period [0]. The second case reports a slight 0.43% decrease from period [-2] to period [-1] 
and a 9.52% surge from period [-1] to period [0] (the fiscal year immediately after the market 
change). This means that companies tend to increase their cash holdings when moving from 
the MM to the AIM (following what was predicted in H1). Motives, such as, the 
precautionary motive expressed in the “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money” Keynes (1936) and confirmed by subsequent authors may be one of the causes for 
such result. The different characteristics of the two markets, described in section 2, is also a 
factor that can be perceived as responsible for these results. Companies moving to the AIM 
will be entering a market with less liquidity and therefore can respond to this adversity by 
holding cash to finance future investments or to even run their business operations. 
Table 4. MM to AIM [-1,+1] 
MM to AIM [-1,+1] 
  Non-Industry Adjusted Industry Adjusted 
Periods Cash Cash 
-1 0.185 0.067 
0 0.196 0.079 
1 0.169 0.052 
 
Table 5. MM to AIM [-2,+2]  
MM to AIM [-2,+2] 
  Non-Industry Adjusted Industry Adjusted 
Periods Cash Cash 
-2 0.178 0.060 
-1 0.178 0.060 
0 0.194 0.077 
1 0.163 0.047 
2 0.165 0.049 
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In the second year after moving to the AIM it is visible that companies cash holdings 
decrease by 14.17% for the period [-1, +1], and 19.23% for the period [-2, +2]. To our best 
knowledge, there is no empirical support or evidence on these results. However, this 
outcome can be justified by the possibility of bankruptcy proximity following the move to a 
market with less liquidity. It is important to outline this occurrence as it is common to both 
analysed periods. 
This analysis is consistent with the industry adjusted results present in tables 4 and 5, 
as the changes follow the same direction of the ones presented in the cash holdings variable 
analysis. So, when controlling for the industry factor, industry adjusted cash holdings for the 
period [-1,+1] increased in 17.85% from period [-1] to [0] and for the period [-2,+2] increase 
in 0.81% from period [-2] to [-1] and 21.39% from period -1 to 0. 
When looking at the industry adjusted results, in table 4 and 5 it is also possible to 
depict that the mean industry adjusted cash in the years after the move to the AIM is 
decreasing. For instance, for the period [-2, +2] in the fiscal year immediately after the move 
([0]) the industry adjusted cash reports a co-efficient of 0.077 while two years after it is already 
0.049. This means that as companies spend longer time in the AIM they tend to adjust to the 
levels of the companies operating in the same industry. This mean reversion shows that the 
amount of cash held by companies is also affected by their peer’s behaviour and decision 
making. 
5.1.2. Regressions Analysis 
As described in section 3 we estimated a model that aims at capturing the effect a 
market change has on companies cash holdings.  
When analysing the regressions (see tables 6 and 7) close attention should be drawn 
to the variable After. This variable was computed according to the method used in Brisker et 
al. (2013). This contemplates a dummy variable that equals 1 for the years after the move to 
the AIM/MM and 0 for the years spent in the MM/AIM before the move, for the regression 
models estimated in the study. Following Brisker et al. (2013) we decided to control for firm 
and year fixed effects, by creating dummy variables for the sampled years and companies. 
The variable After has a negative coefficient significant at 5% level for the period [-
1,+1] and a negative coefficient significant at 1% level for the period [-2,+2]. This shows 
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that companies tend to hold less cash after moving from the MM to the AIM. Giving 
consistency to these results is the fact that when we control for the firm and year fixed effects 
the sign of the coefficient remains negative and the statistical significance remains at 1%, 
except for the result achieved in table 6 columns (2) and (3) where it goes to 5% and 10%, 
respectively. This result is also consistent with the drop visible in table 4 and 5 analysed in 
the previous section. Albeit, demonstrating an increase in cash holdings immediately after 
the move, verified that this variable suffered a significant decrease for the years following the 
market change. 
As witnessed in, Brisker et al. (2013), the industry a company operates in has an 
impact on the amount of cash held by the firm. We can see evidence of this in tables 4 and 
5, where cash is converging to zero15 following the maturity of the company in the market. 
For this reason, we decided to adjust the dependent variable Cash to the industry. The results 
reported in columns (4), (5) and (6) of tables 6 and 7 enforce the results achieved in the non-
industry adjusted section. For the two analysed periods the variable After also features a 
negative coefficient with the significance level ranging from 1% to 10%. 
  
                                                 
15 Given that the industry adjusted cash is computed comparing the median of each industry with the median 
of each firm, the closer the coefficient is to zero means the closer the firms cash holdings is to that of the 
industry. 
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Table 6. Regression results MM to AIM [-1,+1]     
Regression results MM to AIM [-1,+1] 
Independent 
Variables   Non-industry adjusted   Industry adjusted 
   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                 
Intercept  0.394*** 0.532 0.438***  0.252*** 0.411 0.334** 
  (0.028) (.) (0.141)  (0.027) (.) (0.136) 
After  -0.029** -0.031** -0.035*  -0.031* -0.031** -0.040** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.018)  (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) 
Cash Flows  -0.093 -0.025 -0.027  -0.041 -0.034 -0.035 
  (0.066) (0.062) (0.068)  (0.062) (0.069) (0.075) 
Acquisitions  -0.318*** -0.569*** -0.540***  -0.310*** -0.566*** -0.549*** 
  (0.068) (0.123) (0.132)  (0.064) (0.120) (0.132) 
Inventory  -0.334*** -0.280 -0.282  -0.212*** -0.252 -0.277 
  (0.095) (0.199) (0.213)  (0.070) (0.205) (0.219) 
Expenditures  -0.614*** -0.516** -0.535**  -0.508*** -0.558*** -0.580*** 
  (0.194) (0.204) (0.211)  (0.159) (0.198) (0.204) 
Net Working 
Capital  -0.305*** -0.880*** -0.889***  -0.274*** -0.814*** -0.813*** 
  (0.083) (0.193) (0.192)  (0.068) (0.201) (0.197) 
R&D  0.421*** -0.387* -0.403*  0.192 -0.429* -0.465* 
  (0.129) (0.211) (0.229)  (0.144) (0.252) (0.253) 
Market-to-book  0.002 0.001 0.000  0.002 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage  -0.461*** -0.065 -0.061  -0.398*** -0.068 -0.060 
  (0.073) (0.134) (0.145)  (0.065) (0.142) (0.154) 
         
Observations  436 436 436  436 436 436 
Nº Companies  145 145 145  145 145 145 
R-squared  0.436 0.828 0.833  0.320 0.772 0.777 
Year Fix. Effect  No No Yes  No No Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 7. Regression results MM to AIM [-2,+2]     
Regression results MM to AIM [-2,+2] 
Independent 
Variables   Non-industry adjusted   Industry adjusted 
   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                 
Intercept  0.386*** 0.529*** 0.636***  0.246*** 0.418*** 0.549*** 
  (0.035) (0.067) (0.089)  (0.034) (0.070) (0.099) 
After  -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.023***  -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.022*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.005)  (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) 
Cash Flows  -0.080* -0.007 -0.005  -0.034 0.000 0.003 
  (0.045) (0.031) (0.032)  (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) 
Acquisitions  -0.269*** -0.355*** -0.343***  -0.301*** -0.366*** -0.351*** 
  (0.080) (0.122) (0.122)  (0.057) (0.119) (0.116) 
Inventory  -0.253** -0.198 -0.217  -0.118 -0.110 -0.139 
  (0.101) (0.159) (0.162)  (0.083) (0.154) (0.157) 
Expenditures  -0.493*** -0.296** -0.296**  -0.404*** -0.268* -0.266* 
  (0.161) (0.135) (0.130)  (0.151) (0.149) (0.145) 
Net Working 
Capital  -0.347*** -0.837*** -0.843***  -0.303*** -0.792*** -0.795*** 
  (0.083) (0.170) (0.167)  (0.077) (0.174) (0.172) 
R&D  0.388*** -0.246 -0.239  0.165 -0.302 -0.293 
  (0.109) (0.184) (0.183)  (0.107) (0.194) (0.193) 
Market-to-book  0.002 -0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage  -0.464*** -0.139* -0.137*  -0.424*** -0.135* -0.132* 
  (0.084) (0.076) (0.077)  (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) 
         
Observations  631 631 631  631 631 631 
Companies  126 126 126  126 126 126 
R-squared  0.412 0.770 0.780  0.293 0.719 0.731 
Year Fix. Effect  No No Yes  No No Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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5.2. AIM to MM 
5.2.1. Market change impact in companies cash holdings 
After testing what happens to companies’ cash holdings when moving from a more 
regulated and liquid market to a market with barriers of entry but less liquidity and regulation, 
we decided to test the effect of the opposite move. 
As seen by the examples mentioned in Section 2.1. a move from the AIM to the MM 
is expected to be performed by companies seeking for growth opportunities, which can be 
reached by the credibility and leverage (credit availability) environment provided by the MM. 
Tables 8 and 9 show the evolution of cash holdings means through time for the 
periods [-1,+1] and [-2,+2]. These tables also contemplate a comparison between cash 
holdings adjusted and non-adjusted to their operating industry. For the 3-year period it is 
noticeable that cash holdings tend to decrease following the market change. From [-1] to 
[+1] non-industry adjusted cash decreased by 7.15% and from [-2] to [+2] it decreased 
23.85%. Results were also collected for the industry adjusted cash. For the period [-2,+2] 
detailed in table 9, it is possible to confirm the reliability of the results as a 62.10% decrease 
is conveyed for the mean industry adjusted cash holdings for the year before the market 
change compared with the coefficient reporting to three years after this change. 
Table 8. AIM to MM [-1,+1]  
AIM to MM [-1,+1] 
  Non-Industry Adjusted Industry Adjusted 
Periods Cash Cash 
-1 0.190 0.024 
0 0.185 0.016 
1 0.176 0.026 
 
Table 9. AIM to MM [-2,+2] 
AIM to MM [-2,+2] 
  Non-Industry Adjusted Industry Adjusted 
Periods Cash Cash 
-2 0.229 0.060 
-1 0.179 0.011 
0 0.180 0.012 
1 0.182 0.033 
2 0.174 0.023 
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Albeit, being consistent with the hypothesis that companies moving from the AIM 
to the MM would have incentives to decrease their cash holdings levels (following H2), 
results are not statistically significant. The main reason, and one of the limitations of this 
study is related to the considerably small sample used. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
AIM is a relatively recent market, which did not comport many moves to the MM as it would 
be desired for achieving a more reliable result. As it can be verified by the information 
available in tables 10 and 11 for the period [-1,+1] we only collected 87 observations 
corresponding to 29 companies, while for the period [-2,+2] we collected 135 observations 
which corresponds to 27 moving companies. 
5.2.2. Regressions Analysis 
The variable After, as in the previous regressions analysis is the variable to which we 
draw more attention. This is because this dummy variable accurately measures the impact 
market move has on cash holdings. 
Despite being non-statistically significant we can see that for both scenarios in period 
[-1,+1] the information collected by the regressions not controlling for the year and firm 
fixed effects reports a negative coefficient for this variable (see table 10). This means that 
companies reported a lower cash holding level after moving to the AIM, and the same 
remains constant for this period. 
However, looking at the regression computed for the period [-2,+2] the outcome 
portrays different results (see table 11). The most interesting result is the one present in 
column (6) where we can see that the coefficient for the variable After is positive at a 5% 
statistical significance level. This means that when we control for the firm and year fixed 
effects and adjust cash holdings for their operating industry the data suggests that companies 
moving from the AIM to the MM have a higher level of cash holdings.  
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Table 10. Regression results AIM to MM [-1,+1]     
Regression results AIM to MM [-1,+1] 
Independent 
Variables   Non-industry adjusted   Industry adjusted 
   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                 
Intercept  0.222*** 0.093 0.369***  0.029 0.049 0.414*** 
  (0.052) (0.063) (0.058)  (0.076) (0.066) (0.037) 
After  -0.023 -0.008 -0.028  -0.001 0.005 -0.025 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.077)  (0.034) (0.041) (0.077) 
Cash Flows  0.135 -0.222 -0.023  0.012 -0.259 -0.017 
  (0.126) (0.211) (0.089)  (0.174) (0.238) (0.117) 
Acquisitions  -0.145 0.048 0.087  -0.062 0.052 0.105 
  (0.242) (0.206) (0.191)  (0.227) (0.240) (0.196) 
Inventory  -0.832*** -1.545 -2.089**  -0.756*** -1.508 -2.158* 
  (0.268) (0.941) (0.911)  (0.215) (1.077) (1.086) 
Expenditures  0.126 -0.500* -0.298  0.315 -0.575** -0.494 
  (0.228) (0.268) (0.872)  (0.264) (0.282) (0.989) 
Net Working 
Capital  
-0.118 -0.060 -0.773** -0.136 0.107 -0.792* 
  
(0.177) (0.312) (0.380) 
 
(0.243) (0.346) (0.398) 
R&D  1.055** -0.665 -0.550**  0.611 -0.646 -0.534** 
  (0.427) (0.488) (0.229)  (0.385) (0.541) (0.234) 
Market-to-book  0.007 0.001 -0.012  0.007 0.000 -0.013 
  (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) 
Leverage  -0.322*** -0.103 -0.022  -0.160 -0.119 -0.052 
  (0.092) (0.206) (0.241)  (0.098) (0.246) (0.245) 
         
Observations  87 87 87  87 87 87 
Companies  29 29 29  29 29 29 
R-squared  0.476 0.860 0.924  0.286 0.791 0.898 
Year Fix. Effect  No No Yes  No No Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 11. Regression results AIM to MM [-2,+2]    
Regression results AIM to MM [-2,+2] 
Independent Variables Non-industry adjusted   Industry adjusted 
   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                 
Intercept  0.221*** 0.106 0.174  0.053 0.063 0.190* 
  (0.045) (0.072) (0.112)  (0.064) (0.062) (0.103) 
After  -0.014 -0.006 0.057  0.003 0.016 0.073** 
  (0.025) (0.022) (0.035)  (0.033) (0.024) (0.036) 
Cash Flows  0.100 0.036 0.006  -0.009 0.005 -0.025 
  (0.061) (0.172) (0.185)  (0.081) (0.178) (0.196) 
Acquisitions  -0.257* -0.129 -0.081  -0.264** -0.147 -0.051 
  (0.142) (0.157) (0.141)  (0.109) (0.170) (0.149) 
Inventory  -0.223 0.113 0.358  -0.324 0.091 0.354 
  (0.237) (0.390) (0.395)  (0.238) (0.378) (0.369) 
Expenditures  0.048 -0.012 0.152  0.201 -0.014 0.177 
  (0.126) (0.312) (0.379)  (0.200) (0.373) (0.426) 
Net Working Capital -0.265** -0.263 -0.467  -0.242 -0.127 -0.382 
  (0.118) (0.241) (0.281)  (0.154) (0.236) (0.289) 
R&D  0.838** 0.011 -0.047  0.406 -0.059 -0.109 
  (0.323) (0.452) (0.502)  (0.255) (0.439) (0.508) 
Market-to-book  0.011*** 0.006 -0.003  0.010** 0.007 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage  -0.299*** -0.180 -0.216  -0.195** -0.215 -0.294 
  (0.092) (0.244) (0.304)  (0.096) (0.230) (0.288) 
         
Observations  135 135 135  135 135 135 
Companies  27 27 27  27 27 27 
R-squared  0.434 0.760 0.805  0.252 0.679 0.753 
Year Fix. Effect  No No Yes  No No Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect   No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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5.3. Z-score 
As it can be seen from the latter analysis cash holdings are sensible to a variety of 
factors. One factor identified and widely explored in the literature is the financial distress 
caused by bankruptcy probability (Acharya et al., 2012). To understand the impact this 
phenomenon has on our sample we used the measure equation developed by Altman (1968). 
This measure was also used as a robustness test. 
The Altman Z-Score is therefore an equation that computes the probability of a firm 
going bankrupt. This is measured as: 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑍′𝑠 = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.6𝑋4 + 0.999𝑋5 
Table 12 outlines the detail of each variable. 
Table 12. Altman Z-Score detailed variables 
Altman Z-Score detailed variables 
Variable Composition 
X1 Working Capital / Assets 
X2 Retained Earnings / Assets 
X3 EBIT / Assets 
X4 Market Value Equity / Assets 
X5 Sales / Assets 
This equation will produce a score and the greater a firm’s bankruptcy potential, the 
lower its score (Altman, 1968). To measure the impact bankruptcy proximity has on cash 
holdings we divided the sample according to the median. Then the regression model was 
produced for the same variables presented in the regression analysis of Sections 4.1.2. and 
4.2.2. The sample was divided according to their Altman Z-Score and we were therefore able 
to identify the impact bankruptcy proximity has on company cash holdings. The results 
following the regression conditioned by the Z-Score are presented in the annexes in tables 
A.3., A.4., A.5. and A.6. 
First, we analyse the impact Z-Score has on the companies cash holdings when they 
change from the MM to the AIM (see tables A.3. and A.4.). The results achieved by the 
model depict that companies closer to bankruptcy will tend to report a significant reduction 
on their cash holdings when they move from the MM to the AIM. This outcome is significant 
to 1% for all the coefficients of the variable After, except for when both firm and year fixed 
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effects are present (significance level drops to 10% and 5% for the periods [-1,+1] and [-
2,+2], respectively. Interestingly, the same negative coefficient is obtained (overall) for the 
variable After when looking at companies that are further from bankruptcy. Suggesting that 
when companies move from the MM to the AIM there is in fact a tendency for their cash 
holdings to decrease, despite the probability of the firm going bankrupt. However, it was 
attainable that there is a stronger relationship between firms closer to bankruptcy and the 
cash holdings reduction. Therefore, it was expected that companies closer to bankruptcy and 
moving to a market with less liquidity would tend to turn their reliance on internal reserves 
to cope for financial casualties and regular business operations, therefore increasing cash 
holding levels. This however was not verified by the regression. The only problem with the 
regression results for the companies present in the top-tier is the lack of statistical 
significance. 
Second, we analyse the impact of Z-Score on cash holdings for companies changing 
from the AIM to the MM (see tables A.5. and A.6.). When accounting for the companies in 
the low-tier (closer to bankruptcy) it is possible to understand that these companies cash 
holdings tend to decrease following the move to the MM. When looking at companies with 
a lower tendency to go bankrupt we can depict that, in general, their cash holdings tend to 
increase following the market change. This could suggest that although companies have less 
financial distress and moved to a market with better access to capital still maintained 
increasing their cash holdings (when we expected them not too). This result, however, 
contradicting the results achieved in the latter regression analysis lacks statistical significance 
for the outcome gathered for the companies present in the top-tier of the Altman Z-Score 
analysis. 
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6. Conclusion 
The study analysis the variability in UK companies cash holdings following the 
fluctuation between the Alternative Investment Market and the Main Market. The 15-year 
analysed data suggests that a market change has a significant impact on firm cash holdings 
and that this variable is considered by the corporate structure of the firms in the decision-
making process. 
The results achieved by this paper are both conclusive and inconclusive. They are 
conclusive in the way that they allow for a better comprehension of the behaviour cash 
holdings have when firms change from the MM to the AIM. Following the cash means’ and 
the regression analysis we can conclude that moving from the MM to the AIM is a decision 
that will increase companies cash holdings in the year immediately after their move. This is 
due to the less access to credit and the necessity to rely on internal reserves following the 
move to a less liquid market. This study also concludes that the years prior to the immediate 
change will follow a deep decrease in companies cash holdings. This is believed to be driven 
by the adjustment companies may suffer when settling down in a different market and is 
present in the industry adjusted analysis. The longer companies spent in the AIM the closer 
to zero their industry adjusted cash holdings were. Meaning their resemblance with already 
existing firms (operating in the same industry) revealed a significant decrease of the industry 
adjusted cash mean from 0.077 (immediate after change) to 0.049 (3 years after the change). 
The results are inconclusive when it comes to the move from the AIM to the MM. 
This is mainly due to the small sample, which limits the study to non-statistically significant 
results. The size of the sample was conditioned by the fact that the AIM is a recent market 
with a small number of moves to the MM that fulfil the requirements imposed by this study. 
The impact bankruptcy proximity has on firm cash holdings is also tested in this 
study. Bankruptcy plays, according to the results, an interesting role when evaluating the 
amount of cash held by companies. It denotes that the impact of bankruptcy on changes 
from the MM to the AIM has the same direction when the different level of bankruptcy is 
compared (negative coefficient for companies in the top and lower tiers). With more 
conclusive results achieved for companies closer to bankruptcy. For companies that moved 
to the MM the results are more inconclusive and one of the factors contributing to this is 
the small sample problem described in the latter paragraph. 
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Overall these results allow for a better comprehension of cash holdings behaviour 
when applied to a market change between AIM and MM. With maturity adding up to the 
AIM and with companies graduating from this market to the MM we believe more conclusive 
outcomes may surge from future analysis. Moreover, an analysis of the macroeconomic 
impact in cash holdings evaluating the price of money (i.e. interest rates) together with other 
variables can be computed to develop a better understanding of the relationship between 
cash holdings and the two UK markets. 
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Annexes 
 
Table A.1. MM admission fees for UK and international companies 
 
Source: LSE: Fees for Issuers 
 
Table A.2. AIM admission fees 
 
Source: LSE: Fees for companies and nominated advisers 
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Table A.3.               
Impact of Altman Z-Score on MM to AIM cash holdings results for [-1,+1] 
Independent Variables   Non-Industry Adjusted   Industry Adjusted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                              
Intercept  0.412*** 0.350*** 0.523*** 0.577*** 0.152 0.555***  0.260*** 0.226*** 0.446** 0.455*** 0.143 0.443*** 
  (0.041) (0.056) (0.180) (0.099) (0.380) (0.028)  (0.044) (0.045) (0.193) (0.109) (0.385) (0.046) 
After  -0.069*** -0.002 -0.081*** 0.000 -0.111* 0.013  -0.066*** -0.003 -0.082*** 0.000 -0.115* 0.014 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.009) (0.067) (0.022)  (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.010) (0.066) (0.023) 
Cash Flows  -0.095 0.163** 0.009 -0.068 0.030 -0.056  -0.047 0.149** -0.000 -0.082 0.016 -0.056 
  (0.069) (0.074) (0.063) (0.097) (0.084) (0.087)  (0.067) (0.060) (0.074) (0.103) (0.096) (0.092) 
Acquisitions  -0.335*** -0.311*** -0.790** -0.353*** -0.839* -0.337*  -0.294*** -0.366*** -0.790** -0.336*** -0.830* -0.338* 
  (0.086) (0.099) (0.365) (0.111) (0.476) (0.175)  (0.059) (0.098) (0.375) (0.119) (0.493) (0.181) 
Inventory  -0.622*** -0.148* -0.306 -0.047 -0.241 0.001  -0.432*** -0.086 -0.280 0.023 -0.245 0.015 
  (0.130) (0.083) (0.258) (0.250) (0.323) (0.223)  (0.071) (0.086) (0.281) (0.252) (0.326) (0.232) 
Expenditures  -0.809*** -0.520** -0.723* -0.414*** -0.733 -0.284**  -0.802*** -0.299 -0.779* -0.360 -0.774 -0.229** 
  (0.192) (0.239) (0.421) (0.034) (0.460) (0.125)  (0.249) (0.184) (0.451) (.) (0.486) (0.108) 
Net Working Capital  -0.085 -0.387*** -0.555** -1.160*** -0.447* -1.247***  -0.130 -0.323*** -0.501* -1.119*** -0.370 -1.226*** 
  (0.111) (0.093) (0.234) (0.250) (0.229) (0.230)  (0.091) (0.085) (0.253) (0.257) (0.228) (0.228) 
R&D  0.378** 0.405 -0.597* 0.172 -0.934** 0.557  0.167 -0.128 -0.589 0.250 -0.978** 0.652 
  (0.148) (0.292) (0.350) (1.266) (0.419) (1.173)  (0.173) (0.482) (0.432) (1.356) (0.438) (1.298) 
Market-to-book  -0.001 0.006** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000  -0.001 0.004** -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Leverage  -0.458*** -0.543*** -0.102 -0.149 -0.036 -0.209  -0.364*** -0.512*** -0.127 -0.221 -0.063 -0.263 
  (0.098) (0.103) (0.189) (0.150) (0.245) (0.163)  (0.086) (0.092) (0.197) (0.165) (0.253) (0.178) 
               
Observations  216 215 216 215 216 215  216 215 216 215 216 215 
R-squared  0.433 0.453 0.848 0.926 0.864 0.937  0.315 0.382 0.796 0.908 0.818 0.921 
Year Fix. Effect  No No No No Yes Yes  No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1              
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) present results for the data representing the companies closer to bankruptcy (before the median Z-score), while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) 
present results for the data representing the companies further from bankruptcy (after the median Z-score). 
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Table A.4.               
Impact of Altman Z-Score on MM to AIM cash holdings results for [-2,+2] 
Independent Variables Non-Industry Adjusted   Industry Adjusted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                              
Intercept  0.435*** 0.284*** 1.046*** 0.457*** 0.664*** 0.497***  0.279*** 0.176*** 0.935*** 0.354*** 0.532*** 0.394*** 
  (0.046) (0.044) (0.031) (0.098) (0.157) (0.087)  (0.044) (0.036) (0.031) (0.106) (0.167) (0.092) 
After  -0.059** -0.011 -0.075*** -0.002 -0.048** 0.006  -0.057*** -0.018 -0.073*** -0.007 -0.052** 0.013 
  (0.025) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019)  (0.020) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
Cash Flows  -0.079 0.225** 0.007 0.041 0.020 0.036  -0.045 0.206** 0.014 0.044 0.024 0.046 
  (0.048) (0.091) (0.032) (0.074) (0.033) (0.078)  (0.044) (0.089) (0.037) (0.079) (0.039) (0.082) 
Acquisitions  -0.272** -0.300*** -0.344** -0.250*** -0.295* -0.256***  -0.276*** -0.350*** -0.352** -0.247*** -0.286* -0.230*** 
  (0.112) (0.087) (0.168) (0.054) (0.169) (0.076)  (0.076) (0.073) (0.167) (0.051) (0.170) (0.061) 
Inventory  -0.436*** -0.095 -0.093 -0.344** -0.032 -0.357**  -0.295*** -0.000 -0.037 -0.220 -0.002 -0.274 
  (0.163) (0.069) (0.201) (0.151) (0.237) (0.155)  (0.114) (0.089) (0.191) (0.171) (0.221) (0.168) 
Expenditures  -0.799*** -0.297** -0.670*** 0.011 -0.690*** 0.021  -0.840*** -0.140 -0.598** 0.027 -0.559* 0.042 
  (0.218) (0.149) (0.220) (0.189) (0.225) (0.189)  (0.201) (0.126) (0.295) (0.193) (0.300) (0.185) 
Net Working Capital -0.256** -0.322*** -0.830*** -0.722*** -0.826*** -0.716***  -0.232** -0.294*** -0.745*** -0.732*** -0.729*** -0.727*** 
  (0.121) (0.086) (0.205) (0.248) (0.200) (0.249)  (0.102) (0.086) (0.208) (0.253) (0.200) (0.254) 
R&D  0.336*** 0.221 -0.279 0.480 -0.266 0.316  0.115 -0.284 -0.330 0.585 -0.308 0.552 
  (0.121) (0.239) (0.246) (0.683) (0.260) (0.711)  (0.125) (0.311) (0.271) (0.729) (0.280) (0.723) 
Market-to-book -0.002 0.010*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000  -0.004 0.010*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Leverage  -0.492*** -0.490*** -0.129 -0.224** -0.124 -0.232*  -0.420*** -0.480*** -0.120 -0.274*** -0.119 -0.280** 
  (0.112) (0.090) (0.107) (0.112) (0.112) (0.133)  (0.094) (0.082) (0.105) (0.104) (0.110) (0.121) 
               
Observations  313 313 313 313 313 313  313 313 313 313 313 313 
R-squared  0.400 0.446 0.773 0.809 0.787 0.821  0.299 0.377 0.727 0.790 0.742 0.803 
Year Fix. Effect  No No No No Yes Yes  No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) present results for the data representing the companies closer to bankruptcy (before the median Z-score), while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) 
present results for the data representing the companies further from bankruptcy (after the median Z-score). 
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Table A.5.               
Impact of Altman Z-Score on AIM to MM cash holdings results for [-1,+1] 
Independent Variables Non-Industry Adjusted   Industry Adjusted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                              
Intercept  0.237*** 0.134** 0.333** 0.312* 0.205 0.791*  0.021 0.010 0.366*** 0.191 0.314 0.813* 
  (0.074) (0.063) (0.119) (0.151) (0.463) (0.353)  (0.091) (0.098) (0.127) (0.194) (0.468) (0.411) 
After  -0.066** 0.043 -0.040 0.023 -0.271 -0.025  -0.031 0.026 -0.026 0.035 -0.234 -0.015 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.077) (0.029) (0.239) (0.064)  (0.037) (0.025) (0.091) (0.042) (0.236) (0.127) 
Cash Flows 0.194 0.243 -0.257 -0.024 0.122 0.193  0.029 0.316 -0.324 -0.113 0.080 -0.102 
  (0.172) (0.446) (0.284) (0.402) (0.206) (0.913)  (0.204) (0.572) (0.314) (0.638) (0.228) (1.305) 
Acquisitions 0.275 -0.492 0.126 -0.133 0.130 -0.102  0.297 -0.418 0.142 -0.089 0.296 -0.146 
  (0.600) (0.296) (0.307) (0.187) (0.687) (0.258)  (0.455) (0.402) (0.350) (0.232) (0.660) (0.312) 
Inventory  -1.378* -0.721* -1.596 -1.124 -4.213* -1.640  -0.913 -0.909 -0.997 -1.481 -3.769 -1.652 
  (0.756) (0.367) (1.751) (1.047) (1.978) (1.390)  (0.631) (0.683) (2.080) (1.217) (2.108) (1.535) 
Expenditures 0.441* -0.314 -0.395 -0.609 -1.883 -0.530  0.603** -0.666 -0.339 -1.051 -1.734 -0.976 
  (0.255) (0.500) (0.300) (0.917) (1.396) (1.854)  (0.271) (0.766) (0.359) (1.697) (1.435) (3.168) 
Net Working Capital 0.354 -0.092 -0.034 -0.019 0.528 -0.908  0.041 -0.106 -0.167 0.195 0.410 -1.152 
  (0.256) (0.325) (0.593) (0.452) (1.272) (0.853)  (0.402) (0.465) (0.656) (0.681) (1.255) (0.994) 
R&D  1.200** 0.040 -0.604 -2.334* -0.123 -0.948  0.760 -0.739 -0.610 -2.759 -0.139 -0.765 
  (0.495) (0.453) (0.630) (1.224) (0.234) (1.062)  (0.460) (0.899) (0.740) (1.837) (0.269) (1.238) 
Market-to-book -0.001 0.027*** -0.005 0.017** -0.006 0.003  0.000 0.022*** -0.006 0.017* -0.010 0.007 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.018) 
Leverage  -0.376** -0.221 -0.825* 0.285 0.164 0.361  -0.151 -0.130 -1.043** 0.182 -0.085 0.210 
  (0.165) (0.152) (0.401) (0.363) (1.203) (0.377)  (0.162) (0.206) (0.429) (0.473) (1.220) (0.459) 
               
Observations 44 43 44 43 44 43  44 43 44 43 44 43 
R-squared  0.541 0.509 0.884 0.922 0.968 0.976  0.365 0.301 0.799 0.893 0.954 0.961 
Year Fix. Effect No No No No Yes Yes  No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) present results for the data representing the companies closer to bankruptcy (before the median Z-score), while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) 
present results for the data representing the companies further from bankruptcy (after the median Z-score). 
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Table A.6.               
Impact of Altman Z-Score on AIM to MM cash holdings results for [-2,+2] 
Independent Variables Non-Industry Adjusted   Industry Adjusted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                              
Intercept  0.262*** 0.152** 0.188** 0.222 0.312*** 0.448**  0.073 0.004 0.150** 0.007 0.293*** 0.316* 
  (0.055) (0.058) (0.072) (0.219) (0.031) (0.174)  (0.066) (0.094) (0.066) (0.238) (0.032) (0.174) 
After  -0.056* 0.036* -0.006 0.027 -0.022 0.017  -0.022 0.044 0.025 0.047* 0.014 0.034 
  (0.033) (0.021) (0.048) (0.025) (0.052) (0.044)  (0.042) (0.029) (0.056) (0.028) (0.057) (0.044) 
Cash Flows 0.124** 0.284 -0.062 -0.099 -0.145 -0.088  0.022 0.303 -0.084 -0.225 -0.174 -0.265 
  (0.061) (0.284) (0.183) (0.413) (0.228) (0.327)  (0.072) (0.422) (0.198) (0.504) (0.238) (0.427) 
Acquisitions -0.232 -0.271 0.032 -0.237** -0.107 -0.139  -0.129 -0.355 0.052 -0.221* 0.080 -0.091 
  (0.156) (0.232) (0.198) (0.115) (0.197) (0.116)  (0.156) (0.220) (0.227) (0.113) (0.210) (0.104) 
Inventory  0.141 -0.707** 0.080 -0.192 0.066 -0.034  0.125 -0.779 0.173 -0.312 0.042 0.084 
  (0.354) (0.352) (0.294) (0.345) (0.413) (0.444)  (0.230) (0.544) (0.321) (0.488) (0.421) (0.577) 
Expenditures 0.032 -0.167 0.286* -0.789* 0.400 -0.842*  0.341 -0.355 0.313 -1.011* 0.511 -1.007* 
  (0.273) (0.323) (0.157) (0.441) (0.390) (0.485)  (0.247) (0.532) (0.205) (0.542) (0.457) (0.515) 
Net Working Capital -0.465 -0.100 0.247 -0.470* 0.306 -0.904***  -0.462 -0.114 0.271 -0.211 0.432 -0.851*** 
  (0.295) (0.238) (0.268) (0.246) (0.466) (0.201)  (0.295) (0.321) (0.282) (0.269) (0.489) (0.205) 
R&D  0.931** 0.379 -0.181 -1.596 -0.330 -0.984  0.535* -0.068 -0.233 -1.916 -0.364 -1.301* 
  (0.355) (0.504) (0.437) (1.540) (0.377) (0.684)  (0.285) (0.709) (0.453) (1.984) (0.407) (0.765) 
Market-to-book 0.006* 0.018** 0.006 0.015* -0.006 0.014*  0.003 0.018*** 0.007 0.015* -0.005 0.021*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage  -0.292*** -0.240 -0.623*** 0.262 -0.689*** 0.194  -0.166 -0.209* -0.669*** 0.142 -0.751*** 0.054 
  (0.109) (0.169) (0.220) (0.193) (0.209) (0.208)  (0.103) (0.118) (0.221) (0.252) (0.234) (0.230) 
               
Observations 68 67 68 67 68 67  68 67 68 67 68 67 
R-squared  0.478 0.381 0.795 0.854 0.871 0.941  0.294 0.277 0.660 0.836 0.792 0.937 
Year Fix. Effect No No No No Yes Yes  No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fix. Effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes   No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) present results for the data representing the companies closer to bankruptcy (before the median Z-score), while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) 
present results for the data representing the companies further from bankruptcy (after the median Z-score). 
 
